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I. INTRODUCTION
Government regulation of commercial enterprises takes many forms.
Among the most familiar forms are requirements that commercial
speakers convey particular government -approved commercial messages,
presumably for the sake of some sufficient benefit to the persons
thereby informed. This Article discusses the difficult problems
generated by the case law of compelled commercial speech.
Controversies and important paradoxes are examined herein, on the
way to the surprising conclusion that in light of the ordinarily limited
interests on both sides of the case, typical compelled commercial speech
cases can be responsibly resolved, all else equal, by merely flipping a
Coin.
First, the Article briefly outlines the Supreme Court of the United
States's most important compelled commercial speech cases.1 These
cases arise in the broader context of commercial speech regulation more
generally. 2 The leading Supreme Court case focusing distinctively on
legally compelled commercial speech is that of Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel.3 The compelled commercial speech cases,
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1. See infra Section II.
2. The touchstone of which is still Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson also briefly addresses the vexed question of
the boundary between commercial speech and non-commercial speech of all sorts, which
we shall not herein pursue.
3. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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including Zauderer, have already generated conflicting scholarly
reactions.4
The Article then discusses a number of important problems latent in
the Supreme Court case law, some of which have been identified, but
conflictingly addressed by the lower federal courts.5 Most surprisingly,
it turns out that contrary to nearly universal belief, we actually cannot
say that the Zauderer compelled commercial speech test really is,
overall, less protective of recognized commercial speech rights than is
the broader Central Hudson test.6
On the basis of the relevant case law and the available empirical
evidence, the Article then considers uncertainties, complications,
conflicts, and mixed results of compelled commercial speech regulation,7
in general 8 and more particularly regarding nutrition, diet, health, and
disease.9
The Article then concludeso that all else equal, the empirical
evidence, legal assumptions, doctrines, tests, and values, including the
value of commercial free speech, as they are typically construed,
suggest that typical compelled commercial speech cases could be as
justifiably determined by randomly flipping a coin as by any more
respectable adjudicative process. As it turns out, both the recognized
commercial speech interests and the real magnitude of the government
regulatory interest, as actually advanced in practice by the typical
compelled commercial speech regulation, tend to be quite modest. There
are, surprisingly, typically only limited legal interests on both sides of
the case.
II. THE RELEVANT SUPREME COURT CASE HISTORY
Commercial speech was not granted distinctive constitutional
protection until the 1976 case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
4. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Compelled Commercial Speech and the First
Amendment, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1749, 1772-74 (2019). But see STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN,
WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT? ch. 6 (Cambridge University Press ed.,
2016). Professor Redish would, in general, typically accord stringent protection to
commercial speakers, whether the restriction in question involves compelled commercial
speech or prohibitions of commercial speech. Professor Shiffrin's approach is less
solicitous of commercial speech rights in general.
5. See infra Section III.
6. See id. at notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
7. See infra Section IV.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See infra Section V.
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Virginia Citizens Consumer Council." The Court began by recognizing
that many persons care more about their consumer product purchases
than about political issues. 12 In constitutionally enshrining the
individual and collective interest in informed commercial transactions,
the Court retained some scope for regulatory limits on commercial
speech. Thus, commercial speech that is deemed false, deceptive,
misleading, or a proposal for an illegal transaction would simply be
subject to prohibition. 13 Virginia Pharmacy, in this respect, allowed
states to promote the "purity" of the flow of commercial speech as well
as the sheer volume of such speech. 14
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy framed the narrow issue before it as
"whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of
that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients." 15 To
this question, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy answered no. 16
This holding left open whether, or how, states could also regulate
commercial speech on grounds other than falsity, misleadingness,
deceptiveness, or a contemplated illegal activity. 17 Those questions were
addressed four years after Virginia Pharmacy in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission.18 The summary
holding of Central Hudson reasserts and then elaborates on Virginia
Pharmacy's limitations as follows:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly19 advances the
11. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). For a very brief, but relatively recent, updating of the Court's
commercial speech doctrine post-Virginia Pharmacy, see Express Oil Change, LLC v.
Miss. Bd. of Licensure, 916 F.3d 483, 487-88 (5th Cir. 2019).
12. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65.
13. See id. at 770-72.
14. See id. at 771-72.
15. Id. at 773.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 771-72.
18. 447 U.S. 557.
19. This requirement that the substantial government interest be advanced directly,
rather than, presumably, indirectly or not at all, seems curious. Why shouldn't achieving
a substantial interest indirectly ever be permissible? Sometimes, a substantial problem
may only admit of being attacked indirectly. Or we might say that most substantial
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governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary20 to serve that interest. 21
Thus, Central Hudson, as a general commercial-free speech test,
requires, apart from its other elements, merely a showing by the
government of a "substantial" interest in regulating the speech in
question. 22 That is, under Central Hudson, commercial speech can be
regulated, all else equal, if the government interest is merely
substantial, as opposed to compelling, or overridingly important. 23
More crucial for our purposes, the holding in Central Hudson
requires a substantial government interest in restricting the
commercial speech but does not require that the restriction also pass
any sort of interesting balancing test. Specifically, the Court in Central
Hudson does not provide for any possibility that the substantial
problems must be attacked indirectly, to one degree or another. The process of imposing
the death penalty, for example, involves multiple discernible steps.
Perhaps the simplest, and purely stylistic, explanation for why the opinion from Central
Hudson focuses on a distinction between direct and indirect advancement, rather than on
substantially advancing the government interest, is that the immediately prior element of
the test, on the required weight of the government interest, has itself already referred to
the distinction between substantial and insubstantial.
Technically, it would be possible for a multipart judicial test to require a substantial
government interest, a substantial advancement of that substantial interest, and a
substantial relationship between the substantial government interest and the regulatory
means chosen to promote that substantial interest. Stylistically, though, one use of
'substantial" precludes any other use of the same term in the same test formulation.
20. This apparently rigorous formulation of a narrow tailoring requirement was
quickly converted into a less demanding requirement of merely reasonable proportionality
between the government interest and the scope of the regulation at issue. See, e.g., Bd. of
Tr. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-80 (1989); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 507
U.S. 410, 416 (1993); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001). For a
similar prompt judicial climb-down from an apparently rigorous narrow tailoring
requirement to a more accommodating inquiry into mere reasonably proportionate
tailoring in the separate free speech area of content-neutral restrictions on speech,
compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (noting an incidental
restriction on speech must be "no greater than is essential" to promote the government
interest) with Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-800 (1989) (rejecting a
least restrictive alternative or genuinely narrow tailoring requirement).
21. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
22. Id.
23. For background, see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226, 2231
(2015). Of course, the holding of Central Hudson allows the categorical exclusion of speech
that is false, deceptive, misleading, or a proposal to engage in an illegal transaction. See
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64. This feature is not explicitly incorporated into the
Zauderer test, 471 U.S. at 651, and in that respect may be more stringently restrictive of
speech than Zauderer, while still being less restrictive of speech than Zauderer in other
respects.
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government interest in regulating the speech may be outweighed, in
any sort of comparative or balancing inquiry, by any other conflicting
government interest, by any conflicting interest asserted by the
commercial speaker, or by any interest of any audience for the
commercial speaker.
Thus, the Court in Central Hudson does not provide for holding a
commercial speech regulation unconstitutional by means of any sort of
interest balancing test. 24 As we shall see below, this feature is not
shared by all constitutional free speech tests applicable to commercial
speech. 25 In particular, the key compelled commercial speech case of
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel26 arguably embodies, in all
instances, just such a broad interest balancing test.27
The Court in Zauderer addresses the regulation of commercial
speech, but in the context in which a government seeks to compel
commercial speech, as distinct from seeking to restrict, suppress, or
prohibit some commercial message the speaker would otherwise wish to
convey.28 The Zauderer test for cases of compelled commercial speech
encompasses several distinct elements. 29
In particular, the Court in Zauderer noted that the speech restriction
at issue involved only an attorney's commercial advertising and a
legally compelled addition to or accompaniment of that speech. 30 The
Court focused, at least in the context of the Zauderer case, on a
governmental interest in dissipating "the possibility of consumer
24. The opinion in Central Hudson does briefly declare that the scope of the
commercial speech restriction "must be in proportion to" the scope of the asserted
governmental interest in restricting the speech in question. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
564. But the Court's reference here to "proportion" is then clarified to refer not to a more
general balancing of interests, but to degrees of tailoring, even though tailoring is then
taken as a separate element of the overall Central Hudson test. Id. at 564-65.
25. See most crucially the discussion infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
26. 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (addressing legally mandated additional disclosures in an
attorney's commercial advertisement).
27. Id. at 651 (referring to the possibility of compelled commercial speech as
potentially "unduly burdensome"). The most obvious construal of an inquiry into possible
undue burdensomeness of a requirement is that some sort of general interest balancing is
involved. Some burdens may be undue, and others not undue. Some sort of broader
assessment and evaluation would thus seem to be implied.
28. Id. at 650 (asserting "material differences between disclosure requirements and
outright prohibitions on speech.").
29. Id. at 651. There is, however, occasional uncertainty over whether all of the
considerations discussed in Zauderer amount to elements of the already applicable
Zauderer test, or instead whether the presence or absence of one or more of these
considerations should instead determine whether Zauderer, or else Central Hudson or
some other test, should govern under the circumstances.
30. Id. at 651.
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confusion or deception" 31 from the advertisement in the absence of the
legally mandated clarifying language. 32
The Court in Zauderer was then careful to specify, although without
any elaboration, that the compelled commercial speech in Zauderer was
both "purely factual," and, in addition, "uncontroversial" information. 33
Clarification of both of these unusually vague requirements was left to
lower courts. 34
At least equally importantly, the holding of Zauderer clearly
prioritized the speech interests of the audience for the commercial
speech in question, 35 specifically by comparison with the assumedly
minimal speech interest of the commercial speaker. 36 The free speech
interests at stake in commercial speech, in general, are thus said to be
primarily those of the consumers, rather than the producers, of
commercial information. 37 In particular, "disclosure requirements
trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat
prohibitions on speech." 38
The Court in Zauderer, however, then arguably imposed serious
qualifications on both the power of governments to compel commercial
speech and on the priority of consumer speech rights over those of
compelled commercial speakers. 39 Specifically, the Court recognized
that "unjustified," or else "unduly burdensome," disclosure
requirements might violate the commercial speaker's free speech
rights. 40
On the most straightforward reading-a judicial test element looking
to undue, or excessive, burdensomeness-amounts to some sort of
comparative balancing test; whatever one's understanding of the free
speech interests of compelled commercial speakers or of their audience
31. Id. For other conceivably sufficient governmental interests, see infra notes 60-74
and accompanying text.
32. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. Of course, preventing possible consumer confusion or
deception had been established as a cognizable and perhaps decisive consumer speech
regulatory interest under the broader Central Hudson test. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
565.
33. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
34. See infra Section III.
35. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id. Actually, though, some "flat prohibitions" on commercial speech may be
narrow or inconsequential for one or more speakers, given the speakers' remaining
alternative speech channels. For brief discussion of the Court's familiar if overbroad
claim, see infra note 92 and accompanying text.




consumers. We pursue the question of a balancing test in Zauderer
below. 4 1
The Court in Zauderer closed its analysis, however, by apparently
backing away from, and perhaps setting aside, not only any balancing,
but much of its immediately preceding concerns and limitations. 42 At
least by the way of a brief explicit summary holding, the Court declared
that "an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related 43 to the State's interest
in preventing deception 44 of consumers." 45
Zauderer remains the preeminent compelled commercial speech case,
whatever its incompleteness, lack of clarity, or controversiality. Among
the Supreme Court cases interpreting Zauderer, we find the
attorney-regulation cases of Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business
and Professional Regulation46 and Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v.
United States.47 The Court in Milavetz treats the decision in Zauderer
at somewhat greater length than does the Court in Ibanez but does
little to clarify holding in Zauderer.48
The Court in Milavetz does characterize the Zauderer compelled
commercial speech test as imposing "less exacting scrutiny"49 than the
commercial speech restriction case of Central Hudson.50 The Court in
Milavetz echoes the assertion in Zauderer that the crucial speech
interests in commercial speech cases are those of audience consumer,
rather than the commercial speaker.5 1 The Court in Milavetz then
simply reiterates Zauderer's odd juxtaposition of an apparent broad
41. See infra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
42. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
43. This use of "reasonably related" may refer either to the limited degree of tailoring
between the purpose and the impact of a regulation under minimal scrutiny, or, in concise
fashion, to the considerations, including of balancing and any undue burdens on the
speaker. Undue burdening is certainly also unreasonable.
44. Again, whether a government's interest in compelled commercial speech can
extend beyond preventing consumer deception is taken up in later cases. See infra notes
60-74 and accompanying text.
45. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
46. 512 U.S. 136, 143 (1994) (noting the holding in Zauderer as imposing upon the
government the burden of showing real, non-speculative, non-conjectural harms to be
remedied by compelled speech).
47. 559 U.S. 229 (2010).
48. Id. at 249-51.
49. Id. at 249.
50. Id. at 255 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting
that the rule in Zauderer imposes "a still lower standard of scrutiny" on speech
regulation, compared to Central Hudson).
51. Id. at 249 (majority opinion citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
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interest balancing test for compelled commercial speech 52 with an
arguably minimalist "reasonable relationship" test.53
The Supreme Court itself has not yet meaningfully addressed the
concerns and uncertainties generated by the Zauderer compelled
commercial speech case.54 Recently, however, the Court, in dicta,
reiterated that under Zauderer, a compelled commercial speech
regulation must not be "unjustified or unduly burdensome" on the
commercial speaker55 and that the regulating government must bear
the burden of showing that the regulation is neither unjustified nor
unduly burdensome. 56 But the Court also did not repudiate its prior
language suggesting something like a mere reasonableness review in
compelled commercial speech cases.57 Nor did the Court explicitly reject
the theory that in compelled commercial speech cases, the free speech
interest at stake is primarily that of the potential audience of
consumers, rather than that of the commercial speaker. 58
Thus, the lower courts have, since the Zauderer opinion, largely been
left on their own to seek, or to construct, clarity in the area of compelled
commercial speech.59 Below, we briefly survey the current state of play
of the major unresolved issues under Zauderer.
52. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651) (referring to
[u]njustified or unduly burdensome" compelled commercial speech requirements).
53. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
54. The Court has referred to its Zauderer test as "more deferential," but by specific
contrast with, apparently, a content-based strict scrutiny test. See Nat'l Inst. of Fam. Life
& Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018). In Becerra, the Court declined
to apply the rule from Zauderer; rather than apply Zauderer and perhaps strike down the
compelled speech regulation, at least in part on the grounds that the compelled speech
was not "purely factual and uncontroversial information" about the speaker's terms of
service. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
55. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2377-78 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
56. See id. (citing Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146). If the Court has chosen to view
governmentally compelled speech, of either a commercial or non-commercial sort, as a
content-based regulation of private actor speech, the Court would then be forced to
address whether compelled commercial speech regulations would then, as
contented-based, trigger demanding strict scrutiny judicial review under Reed, 135 S. Ct.
2218. The Court has thus far declined to decisively clarify the relationship between
commercial speech regulations and regulations based on the content of the speech evoking
strict scrutiny under Reed.
57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. For a sense of the varied academic
responses, see supra note 4. See also Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech
and the Consumer "Right to Know", 58 ARIz. L. REV. 421 (2016) (noting that compelled
commercial speech should be treated as other sorts of restrictions on commercial speech,
and in particular, pursuant to the Central Hudson test); Jonathan H. Adler, Persistent
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III. CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY IN THE LOWER COURTS AS TO
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
First among unresolved issues with the rule from Zauderer is the
scope of applicability of the case. The Court in Zauderer itself referred
only to the government interest in "preventing deception of
consumers."60 This, for a time, led the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit to apply Zauderer only to those
compelled commercial speech cases in which the government interest
was preventing or curing misleading commercial advertising. 61 But a
government might also seek to compel commercial speech for reasons
apart from countering consumer deception. 62 And thus, for a time, the
District of Columbia Circuit applied the more general Central Hudson
test 63 in those cases of compelled commercial speech where the
government interest did not focus on consumer deception.64 But then in
Threats to Commercial Speech, 25 J.L. & POL'Y 289 (2016) (urging less judicial deference
to the consuming public's purported "right to know"); Micah L. Berman, Clarifying
Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50 WAsH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 53, 55 (2016)
("communities should have considerable flexibility to mandate warnings geared towards
protecting the public's health"); Andrew C. Budzinski, Note, A Disclosure-Focused
Approach to Compelled Commercial Speech, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1305, 1309 (2014)
(encouraging "a lenient standard of review to regulations that compel disclosure of factual
information"); Peter Bozzo, The Treachery of Images: Reinterpreting Compelled-Speech
Doctrine, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 965, 1012 (2017) (critiquing, as outmoded, the distinction
between factual statements and emotional appeals); Jennifer M. Keighly, Can You
Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 539, 543 (2012) (urging rational basis review where "the disclosure serves the
state's interest in an informed public, and . . . the disclosure informs the audience ...
instead of spreading the government's normative message"); Felix T. Wu, The Commercial
Difference, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2005, 2009 (2017) ("[i]f the compulsion is directed not
to a person, but to an artificial entity with no intrinsic rights to 'freedom of mind,' then
the rationale for heightened scrutiny of speech compulsions dissolves.").
60. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651; Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 519 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
61. See Nat'lAss'n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 519.
62. See id. For an endorsement of a similarly narrow scope of application for
Zauderer, see Alexis Mason, Note, Compelled Commercial Disclosures: Zauderer's
Application to Non-Misleading Commercial Speech, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1193, 1200
(2018).
63. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66.
64. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 519. A requirement, for example, that the
product to be sold was not, in some specified fashion, involved in civil or international
war, child labor or some other exploitive labor practice, produced in some specified
undesired fashion, or derived from non-local sources, and so on, could be of interest to
much of the public, yet not clearly fall within the standard scope of consumer deception.
See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
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2015, the en banc District of Columbia Circuit flatly held "that
Zauderer in fact does reach beyond problems of deception." 65
More broadly, the general trend among the lower courts seems to
have been to expand the applicability of Zauderer to include
government interests beyond narrow understandings of consumer
deception. 66 Courts have considered, for example, speech requirements
imposed for the sake of encouraging the reduced consumption of some,
if not all, added sugar drinks, 67 along with, interestingly, mention in the
ad itself of the disclosure's legally required status.68 As well, there have
been compelled disclosures with respect to so-called "conflict minerals"
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; 69 "country of origin" meat
labeling requirements;70 reducing obesity by requiring, in practice, a
selected ten percent of local restaurant menus to specify caloric
counts;7 1 environmental enhancement through mandatory labeling of
light bulbs containing mercury; 72 and supposedly promoting public
health and consumers' informed sovereignty through requiring
disclosure that milk-related products derive from, without any required
explanation, what it referred to as "rBST-treated"73 COWS. 74
65. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en bane) (reviewing a
case involving involved a diplomatically interesting "country of origin" labeling
requirement).
66. See, e.g., the accounting in CTIA-The Wireless Ass'n v. City of Berkeley, 873
F.3d 774, 775 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing cases from the United States District Courts of for
the Districts of Columbia, First, Second, and Sixth Circuits), as well as the later stage of
this case reported at 928 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2019).
67. See Am. Beverage Ass'n v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749, 753 (9th
Cir. 2019) (en banc).
68. See id.
69. See Nat'l Ass'n ofMfrs., 800 F.3d at 520.
70. See Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 20.
71. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir.
2009).
72. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2001).
73. Vermont consumers were thus apparently credited with knowing that "rBST'
treatment refers to recombinant Bovine Somotropin, a synthetic hormone growth
stimulant. See Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1996). Query
whether even the bare "r," or the "recombinant," term by even itself would be typically
understood by consumers in any meaningful way. Query, more broadly, the likely
effectiveness of this regulation in significantly promoting the public health, or even in
meaningfully promoting a genuinely knowledgeable consuming public.
74. See id. See also, for a further option, PSEG Long Island LLC v. Town of N.
Hempstead, 158 F. Supp. 3d 149, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (determining that a mandatory
health warning on wooden utility poles treated with the hazardous chemical preservative
"Penta" as not lying within the scope of commercial speech, as the required warning bore
no sufficient relationship to the utility's sales or other commercial interests) (declining as
594 [Vol. 71
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The lower courts have also, inescapably, devoted some attention to
the application and meanings of the Court's distinction in Zauderer
between "purely factual"75 and not purely factual disclosures, 76 as well
as to the Court's equally fascinating distinction between controversial
and uncontroversial compelled disclosures.7 7 In particular, the "conflict
minerals" case of National Association of Manufacturers v. Securities
Exchange Commission78 attempts the unenviable task of identifying
boundary lines between purely factual and non-purely factual
statements, as well as between controversial and uncontroversial
compelled speech requirements in this context.79
The problem here is not just the unusual vagueness of these
distinctions. Vagueness pervades the law, to one degree or another, for
good or ill.8o Rather, references to uncontroversiality, 8 1 and to the idea
of pure factuality as part of a legal test, 82 run directly counter to a
well to largely immunize the requirement as government, rather than private party,
speech).
75. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
76. See id. For a critique, see Bozzo, supra note 59.
77. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. This distinction may well seem to be unusually
"unstable" in context. For background, see Lauren Fowler, Note, The "Uncontroversial"
Controversy in Compelled Commercial Disclosures, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1651 (2019)
(contrasting facticity and ideology).
78. 800 F.3d 518.
79. Nat'l Ass'n ofMfrs., 800 F.3d at 527-30 (citing Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27).
80. See, e.g., TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (2000); Keith C. Culver,
Varieties of Vagueness, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 109 (2004); Robert C. Post, Reconceptualizing
Vagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 491 (1994); Alex Silk,
Theories of Vagueness and Theories of the Law, 25 LEGAL THEORY 132 (2019); Jeremy
Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. L. REV.
509 (1994). More broadly, see, e.g., TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS (1994); Roy
Sorenson, Vagueness, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vagueness.html (rev. version April 5, 2018). For a classic
formulation of the idea of constitutionally excessive vagueness, see the opinion of Justice
Holmes in Connally v. General Constr., Inc., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (referring to a
statutory term that is "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application").
81. Controversial mandated speech may in some cases be only latently controversial,
in the sense of being uncontroversial on its face, but controversial in light of further
information. A mandatory nutrition label on a food product may seem uncontroversial, at
least if more broadly principled objections to all such mandated labels are ignored. But a
food producer may then point to studies contesting the relevance to health of one of the
required nutrition disclosures. For background, see Am. Beverage Ass'n, 916 F.3d at 757.
82. Consider the judiciary's chronic difficulties in distinguishing questions of "fact"
from questions of law, and from "mixed" questions of law and fact. See, e.g.,
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113
(1985). The Pullman-Standard case confesses that no method for unerringly
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number of important current cultural trends. Any meaningful
distinction between pure fact, and say, opinion, value, emotion, and
theory is dubious under, merely for example, various postmodernisms
and their successors, 83 and various other approaches to nature8 4 and
morality.8 5 What we take to be a "fact" may depend crucially on our
preexisting theories, on the instruments with which we choose to seek
and observe "facts," and on our cultural presuppositions more
generally.86
Some apparently factual-mandated commercial message may
actually operate in part as expressions of officially recognized
sympathies and values.87 Any stigmatizing effect of such rules on the
commercial speaker may, or may not, be mitigated if the speaker is
allowed to specify that the speech is legally required and to try to justify
its position on the policy issue in question.8 8 More generally, in
Zauderer, the Court's focus on the ideas of pure factuality and on
uncontroversiality, if they are not simply ill-advised, inescapably add
murkiness and indeterminacies to the application of the test in practice.
A much broader problem with the Zauderer test involves its focus not
on the speech rights of the speaker and the audience,89 but on the
speech rights of the audience.9 0 The Court in Zauderer thus declares
distinguishing matters of fact from matters of law is available. See Pullman-Standard,
456 U.S. at 288. Note that matters of "fact" in our context must be distinguished not so
much from law, as from opinion, from value, and from theory as well.
83. For an overview, see BRIAN MCHALE, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO
POSTMODERNISM (2015).
84. See, e.g., JOHN MCDOWELL, MIND AND WORLD (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed.
1996) (the passivity of our sensory perceptions as complemented by our active
conceptualizing), and the assertions as to the theory-ladenness of supposedly pure
perceptual observations in THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(Univ. of Chicago Press ed., 1970). The distinction between "subjective opinion" and pure
fact is addressed in, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 538 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., Simon Blackburn's projectivist quasi-realism, as briefly expounded in
Richard Joyce, Projectivism and Quasi-Realism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-anti-realism/Projectivism-
quasi-realism.html. More specifically, see Bozzo, supra note 59.
86. See the authorities cited supra notes 83-85, as well as the useful LARRY LAUDAN,
SCIENCE AND RELATIVISM (1990).
87. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 530 (noting the required conflict-free mineral
label as involving an ethical taint, regardless of any favorable or unfavorable actual
effect).
88. See id. at 531-32 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
89. See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57.
90. The audience for mandated safety warnings on wooden utility poles would not
typically be thought of as prospective or actual consumers of those poles. See PSEG Long
Island, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 165.
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that "the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the
information such speech provides."9 1 Even more explicitly, the
commercial speaker's "constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is
minimal." 92
This emphasis on the speech interests of the audience, or of
consumers, rather than those of the commercial speakers, has unusual
implications for the free speech interest analysis. To the extent that
commercial speaker interests are discounted, the regulating
government and the parties with genuine significant free speech
interests will, oddly, tend to be on the same side of the case, and
typically with compatible, if not identical, regulatory and speech
interests. The government and the parties with the crucial speech
interest both tend to favor the compelled speech requirement. The
essential adversarialism of the litigated judicial case is thereby largely
muted or suppressed.
In any compelled commercial speech case, the court presumably
seeks out first some sufficiently weighty government regulatory interest
at stake in the case. Mere speculation by the government, or an
embrace by the government of some marginal purpose, may not
suffice. 93 But if the courts discount the free speech interests of the
commercial speaker, any meaningful scrutiny of the government's
regulatory purpose will, all else equal, typically seem unnecessary. The
significant speech interests will then typically be those of potential
consumers, on whose behalf of the communal speech regulation in
question was presumably adopted. Unless other interests are also taken
91. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
92. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 23. This point is
emphasized in Robert Post, C. Edwin Baker Lecture for Liberty, Equality, and Democracy:
Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 877-78 (2015). In Professor Post's
terms, "[r]egulations that force a speaker to disgorge more information to an audience do
not contradict the constitutional purpose of commercial speech doctrine. They may even
enhance it." Id. at 877. See also id. at 883 ("commercial speakers retain 'minimal First
Amendment interests."). Professor Post's interpretation of Zauderer, in this respect, is in
turn favorably cited in, among other cases, Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 534
(Srinivasan, J., dissenting).
93. As in mere idle public curiosity. Thus, typically, a health or safety interest with at
least modest plausibility may suffice, but a compelled commercial speech regulation that
is justified "on the basis of 'strong consumer interest and the public's "right to know"'
may well not suffice. See Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 73 (bovine recombinant growth hormone
product mandated labeling case).
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into account, the regulation supposedly 94 promotes the wishes and
interests of consumers in having access to whatever commercial
information may be involved.
There are doubtless further complications,9 5 but in typical cases,
even mere curiosity96 on the part of some consumers, legally enshrined
in a compelled commercial speech regulation, would thus seem to be
constitutionally unobjectionable.9 7 Even in the absence of a health or
safety concern,98 consumers might reasonably want mandated
disclosure of, say, the manufacturers' rankings, perhaps by some
government or private agency, on any number of commercial
considerations.9 9 This follows, certainly, if we assume the relevant
speech interests to be as the courts have described them.
A further unresolved problem is that of the required degree of
tailoring between the government purpose and the effect of the
regulation. If the commercial speaker in question does indeed have only
a minimal relevant free speech interest, 100 perhaps greater latitude for
the regulating government would be called for. The case law as it
stands, however, displays uncertainty as to matters of evidentiary
burdens and the required precision of tailoring in the compelled
commercial speech cases. Consider, in particular, the following
differences between the United States Courts of Appeals for the
94. Virtually any of the compelled speech mandates may have unanticipated, often
indirect, consequences that tend to defeat the announced purposes of the compelled
commercial speech regulation. For discussion, see infra Section IV, along with cases such
as Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 530.
95. As in the case of potential audience members who have legal standing to raise
constitutional or other cognizable objections to the (mandated) visibility of the message in
question, or of a compelled commercial speech regulation that is somehow exceptionally
burdensome on the speaker on non-speech grounds.
96. But see CTIA, 928 F.3d at 844; Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 73.
97. For interesting background, see Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 31-33 (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in the judgment). For a more critical outcome, see Adler, Persistent Threats,
supra note 59.
98. As distinct from, say, the broadly construed public "welfare."
99. Merely for example, disclosure of overall environmental rankings, manufacturing
processes, parent companies and subsidiaries, recycling practices, etc. Even consumer
favoring of local, instate, or American products on grounds unrelated to health or safety
might suffice. For discussion, see Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 23. Of course, Dormant
Commerce Clause issues may arise in some such cases. For general background, see, e.g.,
Chris Erchull, Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause A Constitutional Barrier to
Sustainable Agriculture and the Local Food Movement, 36 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 371
(2014).
100. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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Second 01 and NinthlO 2 Circuits on the subject of mandated nutrition
labeling.
The Second Circuit's case addressed a New York City Health Code
requirement that restaurants "post calorie content information on their
menus and menu boards." 103 The court recognized the protected status
of commercial speech in general, but found no constitutional violation1 0 4
where the regulation "mandates a simple factual disclosure of caloric
information and is reasonably related to New York City's goals of
combating obesity."105 Certainly, the typical minimum scrutiny equal
protection case gives the regulating government the benefit of the doubt
not only on the effectiveness of the policy, but on the tailoring of the
regulation to the legislative purpose. 106 One might well wonder whether
the contribution of the mandated calorie, counts by itself to actually
resolving the problem of obesity, is likely to be significant. But one
might also wonder about the degree of tailoring of the regulation to the
interest in reducing obesity, especially when we recognize that the
regulation at stake actually covered only about "ten percent of
restaurants in New York City."10 7
One might thus wonder why a regulation of commercial speech on
the basis of content should be deemed sufficiently tailored in addressing
only ten percent108 of the arguably relevant speakers in question. If we
again discount the speech interests of the commercial speakers,10 9 there
remain the speech interests of the potential audience for the calorie
count messages. 110 Courts that emphasize the interest of consumers in
potentially receiving presumably valuable messages as to calories
should normally want such messages to be disseminated to wider
audiences. Again, the government and the crucial speech interests
should be largely on the same side.
In sharp contrast, the Ninth Circuit has pressed aggressively into
issues of degrees of tailoring in a closely related context.111 San
Francisco required that some, but not all, added-sugar drinks, but not
101. See N.Y State Rest. Assn, 556 F.3d 114.
102. See Am. Beverage Assn, 916 F.3d 749.
103. N.Y State Rest. Assn, 556 F.3d at 117.
104. Id. at 118.
105. Id.
106. See, classically, Ry. Express Agency v. N.Y., 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Minn. v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
107. See N.Y State Rest. Assn, 556 F.3d at 117.
108. See id.
109. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
110. Classically, see Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57.
111. See supra note 102.
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other products with added sugar, bear a particular message in some,
but not all, forms of their advertising of such drinks. 112 Where
applicable, the officially required language ran as follows: "WARNING:
Drinking beverages with added1 13 sugar(s) contributes to obesity,
diabetes, and tooth decay. This is a message from the City and County
of San Francisco." 114 Crucially, from the perspective of the court, this
warning was required to "occupy at least 20% of the advertisement"1 15
in question.
The court ultimately held that, given the need to balance the speech
interests and burdens involved, the 20% minimum requirement was
insufficiently narrowly tailored under Zauderer.116 The court admitted
that the 20% minimum figure has been applied in tobacco advertising
and other contexts.117 And there was also evidence in the record that
relatively large warning messages tend to be more effective than
smaller such messages. 118
The court held, however, that even the government's own evidence
empirically indicated that a warning covering only 10% of the
advertisement, or half the legally required size, would be effective in
generating increased consumer understanding. 119 Thus, the court
concluded that a compelled warning of half the legally required size
"would accomplish Defendant's stated goals." 120 Given the relevant
balancing of burdens and interests under Zauderer,12 1 a minimum space
requirement of 10% would thus be effective and more narrowly tailored
to the aim of the regulation. 122
The Second and Ninth Circuits thus illustrate remarkable judicial
uncertainty and divergence as to even the most basic dimensions of any
112. See Am. Beverage Assn, 916 F.3d at 753, 754 (excluding advertisements in
"periodicals[,] television[,] electronic media," and relatively small advertising signs,
among other exemptions).
113. Thus, advertisements for, say, pure apple juice would fall outside the scope of the
ordinance. See other exemptions id. at 754.
114. Id. at 753.
115. Id. at 754.
116. Id. at 756-57.
117. Id. at 757.
118. Id.
119. See id. Questions of degrees of promoting any government interest tend to be set
aside or downplayed by courts, in the absence of meaningful data. For background, see R.
George Wright, Wiping Away the Tiers of Judicial Scrutiny, 93 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020).
120. Am. Beverage Assn, 916 F.3d at 757.
121. See id. at 756.
122. See id. at 757.
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tailoring inquiry under Zauderer and the ensuing compelled commercial
speech cases. In part, this remarkable uncertainty reflects underlying
judicial confusion over the Court's reference, in Zauderer, to not
imposing undue burdens 123 on the commercial speakers involved in a
given case. 124 A number of the lower court opinions seem to give some
attention to the issue of a possible undue burden imposed by the
regulation on speech. 125 Other courts, however, either implicitly or
explicitly do not.126 Neither the courts incorporating a distinct "undue
burden" test, nor those declining to apply such a test, typically1 27 ask
123. See supra notes 27, 39-40 and accompanying text.
124. It is clearly possible that the most of the relevant burden of compelled commercial
speech falls on audience members, rather than on the speaker. See infra Section IV. But
this does not seem to be the intended thrust of the Court's opinion in Zauderer, despite
the opinion's broader focus on the speech rights of audience members.
125. See, e.g., Am. Beverage Assn, 916 F.3d at 756 (stating that the Zauderer test asks
whether the speech requirement is "(1) purely factual, (2) noncontroversial, and (3) not
unjustified or unduly burdensome"); 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d
1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that compelled commercial speech regulations must not
be "so 'unjustified or unduly burdensome' that they 'chill[] protected commercial speech')
(leaving open the possibility that "unjustifiedness" may itself also be a matter of interest
balancing, as well as the possibility that any interest balancing under Zauderer test must
focus narrowly on chilled protected speech); id. at 1062 (stating similar language); Dwyer
v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 283-84 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizing an "undue burden"
requirement, but apparently limiting its application to chilling, specifically,
constitutionally protected commercial speech, which may involve an unfortunate logical
circularity) (citing, inter alia, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att'y Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d
212, 228-29 (5th Cir. 2011)); Masonry Bldg. Owners v. Wheeler, 394 F. Supp. 3d 1279,
1297 (D. Or. 2019) (reiterating the American Beverage formulation, supra); Core-Mark,
Int'l, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Livestock, 218 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187359, at *12 (D. Mont. 2018)
(inquiring into "undueness" of any burden, but actually finding only a constitutionally
acceptable minimal burden in the form of "a non-obtrusive, factually accurate date stamp
be applied to milk cartons") (but thus taking the compelled speech's presumed factual
accuracy into account at two separate phases of the Zauderer test). For background, see
Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARv. L. REV. 972, 990-91 (2017) (assuming the
Zauderer test to be more lenient than the Central Hudson test, see id. at 973).
126. See, e.g., Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509,
556 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring a mere "reasonable relationship," or reasonable tailoring,
while explicitly setting aside any concern for possible undue burdensomeness or
unjustifiedness of the regulation) (citing Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249-52); N. Y State Rest.
Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 134 (noting regulatory underinclusiveness of factual commercial
messages is permissible under Zauderer, and thus "rational basis applies and NYSRA
concedes that it will not prevail if we apply that test"); Nat'l Electric Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell,
272 F.3d at 114-15 (noting that given the minimal speech impact of compelling only
truthful, factual commercial speech, the crucial test under Zauderer is whether there is "a
rational connection between the purpose of a commercial disclosure requirement and the
means employed to realize that purpose").
127. Consider the suggestion that some compelled commercial speech regulations may
be so burdensome as to practically rule out the most desired forms of commercial
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whether the regulated speaker, or the audience, would still retain any
realistic alternative means of either conveying or receiving the
commercial message in question. 128
Even more importantly, though, any "undue burden" test, or any
similar interest balancing test under Zauderer 29 would imply that the
nearly universal understanding of the stringency of the Zauderer test
as compared to Central Hudson,130 is mistaken. Specifically, the case
law clearly indicates that the test under Zauderer is generally a
"weaker," or less stringent, test 31 than the broader and more familiar
commercial speech test in Central Hudson.132 This popular sense of the
test under Zauderer as simply less stringent and more accommodating,
across the board, of government regulations is mistaken.
Simply put, a commercial speech restriction under Central Hudson
survives, all else equal, if the government can show merely a
substantial1 33 interest that is appropriately promoted by the restriction
advertising by the regulated speaker. See Dwyer, 762 F.3d at 283 (citing Ibanez, 512 U.S.
at 146-47).
128. See generally the authorities cited supra notes 125-26. For the under-recognized
importance of considering the realistic availability and costs of a speaker's remaining
unregulated speech channels, as distinct from any kind of tailoring analysis, see R.
George Wright, The Unnecessary Complexity of Free Speech Law and the Central
Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 PACE L. REV. 57 (1989).
129. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
130. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
131. See, e.g., Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 249; Am. Beverage Assn, 916 F.3d at 767-68
(Nguyen, J., concurring in the judgment) (distinguishing Zauderer's mere "rational basis"
test from Central Hudson's more demanding "intermediate scrutiny" test); Nat'l Assn of
Mfrs., 800 F.3d at 522 (referring to "Zauderer's loose standard of review" and "the more
demanding standard of Central Hudson"); id. at 537 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing "the relaxed standard set forth in Zauderer [and] the more restrictive test
of Central Hudson"); id. at 541 (Srinivasan, J., dissenting) ("of course, if the Rule passes
muster under Central Hudson, it necessarily survives the 'less exacting scrutiny described
in Zauderer'); Safelite Group, Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 259, 261-62 (2d Cir. 2014)
(noting Central Hudson as imposing "intermediate scrutiny," whereas Zauderer requires
only rationality or reasonableness); Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 555
(noting that where applied to factual commercial disclosure requirements, Zauderer as
merely a "rational-basis rule"); N.Y State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 132 (noting the test
under Zauderer as a "rational basis test"); Nat'l Electric Mfrs. Assn, 272 F.3d at 114-15
(accord).
132. For an analysis and critique of the idea of a substantial, as perhaps distinct from
an "undue," burden in the law, see R. George Wright, Substantial Burdens in the Law, 46
Sw. L. REV. 1 (2016).
133. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Substantial is distinct from an overridingly
important, or compelling, government interest in restricting speech. See, e.g., Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
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in question. In contrast, and despite the lesser stringency of the
Zauderer test in other respects, a speech regulation under Zauderer
may not survive, again, all else equal, even if the regulation similarly
promotes a substantial government interest. In fact, regulations may
survive under Central Hudson and yet be struck down under Zauderer
even if the substantial interest being promoted is precisely the same.
This paradox reflects the fact that beyond its initial gatekeeping
exclusion of some forms of objectionable commercial speech, the rule
from Central Hudson is not usually interpreted to require any broad
balancing of interests, beyond reasonable proportionality in tailoring, 134
once a directly promoted substantial interest is shown. 135 The Court in
Central Hudson does not ask whether the advancing of the
substantiall 36 government interest is outweighed, in the sense of
imposing an unduel 37 or excessive burden on the speech interests of
either the commercial speaker or perhaps that speaker's audience. 138
The holding in Central Hudson in this sense lacks a general balancing
test.
But as the opinion from Zauderer is often, though hardly always,
interpreted, the supposedly weaker 39 Zauderer test does indeed
require, where necessary, this additional broad interest balancing
inquiry. 140 Thus, under Zauderer, but typically not Central Hudson, an
attempt to further a substantial government interest might still be
declared unconstitutional, as unduly or excessively burdening the
speech interests of either the speaker or, perhaps, a consumer audience,
as in the case of a confusing or lengthy required disclosure.
We again recognize that Central Hudson allows for striking down, for example, false
commercial speech with no interest balancing. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
134. See id. and the subsequent commercial speech regulation tailoring cases referred
to supra note 20.
135. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. "Direct" promotion may amount in practice to
something like substantial or significant promotion of the interest at stake. But this
inquiry, even if it requires interest balancing at all, does not require interest balancing of
the broader sort invited in Zauderer. See also supra notes 19, 24 and accompanying text.
136. See id.
137. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
138. Recall that the opinion from Zauderer is commonly interpreted to prioritize the
speech rights of consumers, and of other actual or potential audience members, rather
than the speech rights of the commercial speakers themselves. See supra notes 91-92 and
accompanying text.
139. See the sources cited supra note 131.
140. For a recent statement, see CTIA-The Wireless Assn, 928 F.3d at 848-49. See
also the apparently conflicting approaches to "undue burdensomeness" under the test
from Zauderer taken by the courts cited supra notes 125-26.
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The possibility of a broad speech-interest balancing test under
Zauderer only raises the stakes involved in the crucial question of
whether compelled commercial speech is typically effective or broadly
cost-justified. We take up the conflicting intuitions and uncertainties
therein below.
IV. COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN PRACTICE: THE PROBLEMS
OF DETERMINING COST-EFFECTIVENESS
The problems of determining the existence and sizes of the benefits
and the costs, intended and unintended, 14 1 of government regulatory
programs in general have been thoughtfully studied. 142 It is occasionally
suggested that, unfortunately, the benefits and costs of many
regulatory programs can reasonably be thought of as largely
mutually-cancelling. 143 Our focus, though, is on the difficulties in
establishing significant overall net benefits of typical programs of
compelled commercial speech. 144
The costs and benefits of compelled commercial speech programs may
in some respects track those of non-speech oriented regulatory
programs. As merely one example of such tracking, consider the
practice in which major players in a given market actually seek the
implementation of burdensome regulations on that market in order to
disproportionately burden small competitors and potential market
entrants. 145 We can imagine such a practice in the compelled
commercial speech area as well.
141. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL.
ECONOMY 677 (1975).
142. See, e.g., EAMONN BUTLER, PUBLIC CHOICE: A PRIMER (Inst. of Econ. Affairs ed.,
2012); PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN: AND How IT CAN Do
BETTER (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2014); CLIFFORD WINSTON, GOVERNMENT FAILURE
VERSUS MARKET FAILURE: MICROECONOMICS POLICY RESEARCH AND GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE (Brookings Inst. Press ed., 2007); Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated
Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 894 (1936).
143. See SCHUCK, supra note 142, at 4, 20-25 (citing, e.g., WINSTON, supra note 142).
144. The potential benefits of compelled commercial speech could include not only
broad health, welfare, and safely interests, but any separate enhancement of the
audience's free speech interests, as recipients of compelled commercial messages. See
supra notes 60-74 and the accompanying text on the scope of legitimate regulatory
interests under Zauderer; as well as supra note 92 and the authorities cited therein.
145. See, e.g., Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Going for
Growth Interim Report, at ch. 2, www.oecd.org/eco/growth/reducing-regulatory-barriers-
to-competition-2014.pdf; Patrick McLaughlin, Matthew D. Mitchell & Anne Philpot, The




Consider, for example, a state law prohibiting any competitor in a
market from mentioning its own affiliates, in a particular context,
unless that commercial speaker also mentions one or more of their
competitors.146 There is certainly a case to be made that requiring, in
effect, all commercial speakers to mention one more of their own
competitors enhances competition, tends to reduce consumers' search
costs, and adds meaningfully to the typical consumer's storehouse of
relevant commercial information, all at modest cost to the consumer. To
the extent that these effects are real, the consumer's freedom of speech
interests are, presumably, promoted. 147
But it is also possible to tell a different story about requiring
commercial speakers to advertise their own competitors, for free, where
they advertise or otherwise discuss their own or affiliated services. A
requirement that one advertises a competitor-say, a major established
competitor-if one advertises at all, may lead to less advertising, and
thereby less dissemination of the names and services of all market
entrants. Perhaps, in some contexts, this reduced level of commercial
advertising would be thought to ill-serve the free speech interests of
consumers. 148
The court in Safelite Group, Inc. v. Jepsen 149 actually notes
potentially even more severe costs of just this sort of compelled
commercial speech. The court refers to the regulation in question as "a
very serious deterrent to commercial speech." 150 But then, more
specifically, the court, in an opinion by a distinguished law and
economics expert, maintains that "such laws are highly likely to further
covertly protectionist, rather than consumer information, goals-in
particular, by protecting existing businesses, which may be well known,
against new entrants."1 51
On this theory, suppressed advertising in general may tend to
entrench the established competitor's market shares. But the largest
current competitors may already have lower marketing costs per
occupational-licensure. For a conceivably relevant instance as addressed by the Supreme
Court, see the internet sales tax burden discussions in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138
S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
146. As, in summary form, in Safelite Group, Inc., 764 F.3d at 266.
147. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
148. See, most importantly, the fundamental logic underlying the majority opinion in
Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (noting the consuming public's interest in informed market
transactions).
149. 764 F.3d 258; see also supra note 146.
150. Safelite Group, Inc., 764 F.3d at 264. Senior Judge Ralph K. Winter has taught at
the Yale Law School in related areas.
151. Id.
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customer, and this advantage might be blunted by a regulation
requiring them to mention smaller and new market entrants. A new
entrant that can hardly afford to meaningfully advertise might be
harmed by having to mention an already well-known major competitor,
but, in turn, benefitted by being itself repeatedly introduced to potential
customers by that major competitor's own regulated advertising. The
overall effects then, may offset, or may be limited, or simply difficult to
determine.
There is also some evidence in the case law itself of adverse,
unanticipated consequences of commercial speech regulation. 152 Courts
in the commercial speech cases are barred from attempting to justify
their regulations solely on the basis of "speculation or conjecture." 153
But meaningful evidence as to the likely future consequences of a
regulation of commercial speech is often incomplete, skewed, or absent
when such regulations are initially challenged.154 Judging on the basis
of grossly incomplete, biased, speculative, or conjectural evidence
further enhances the likelihood that the overall value of the chosen
judicial result, across time, will be indeterminate, nearly random, or
limited, in light of their actual mixed or offsetting effects.
In the compelled commercial speech cases, the possibility of adverse
unanticipated consequences-indeed, of the perverse "backfiring" of the
regulation in question-has been raised. 155 In National Association of
Manufacturers v. Securities and Exchange Commission,156 the
regulation involved mandated disclosure of the commercial speaker's
use of gold and other metals originating in or near the conflict-torn
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The aim of the regulation was to
decrease the revenue flow to groups perpetuating the armed conflict,
thereby encouraging an abatement of the ongoing humanitarian
crisis. 157
The problem, though, as the court recognized, is the sheer
uncertainty and contestability of this largely empirical prediction. 158
The court recognized in particular the possibility that the labeling
requirement might indeed have perversely backfired. 159 The backfiring
152. See supra notes 141-42.
153. Edenfieldv. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
154. For a critique and a recommended remedy in broader context, see R. George
Wright, supra note 119.
155. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of M'frs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d at 526-27 (discussing "conflict
minerals").
156. 800 F.3d 518.
157. See id. at 526.
158. Id. at 527.
159. Id. at 526.
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might have occurred "because some companies in the United States are
now avoiding the [Democratic Republic of the Congo]," 160 with the
unintended result that "miners are being put out of work or are seeing
even their meager wages substantially reduced, thus exacerbating the
humanitarian crisis and driving them into the rebels' camps as a last
resort." 161 Consequences need not track any government's desires and
intentions.
Again, our point is not that the commercial speech mandate in this
specific case either has, or has not, failed of its essential purpose, or
even made matters substantially worse. This case instead illustrates
the broader claim that commercial speech mandates tend to have
overall results that are either difficult to establish, mixed, limited,
equivocal as to desirable and undesirable actual effects, unclear as any
significant results, a matter of speculation and conjecture, or close to
neutral in their largely offsetting positive and negative effects over any
time frame.
Consider as well compelled commercial speech involving consumer
product labeling, specifically in the area of nutrition information. Recall
that in New York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board
of Health,162 the court addressed a City health regulation requiring a
selected 10%16 3 of City restaurants to "post calorie content information
on their menus and menu boards" for the purpose of "combating
obesity" and related diseases. 164 The real state interest at stake thus
was not merely in providing consumer information, but in actually
significantly changing consumer habits, on the basis of the mandated
information, so as to meaningfully affect obesity and disease levels. 165
160. Id.
161. Id. (citing investigative articles in the journal FOREIGN POLICY and in the
WASHINGTON POST).
162. 556 F.3d 114.
163. See id. at 117.
164. Id. at 118. See also id. at 134 (discussing an "obesity epidemic"). Note that the
City sought, rather more modestly, the mere instrumental or intermediate goal of
reducing "consumer confusion and deception," and of promoting "informed consumer
decision-making," so as to reduce obesity and its related diseases. Id. at 134. Under these
circumstances, however, the instrumental goals would hardly be of much significance if
they did not then somehow lead to significantly better nutrition habits. Even universal
nutritional literacy, with memorized calorie counts, presumably along with other relevant
measures, would hardly be worth pursuing as a state interest if such nutritional literacy
did not lead to significantly upgraded consumer choices. The relevant state interest can
hardly be satisfied by even a flawless consumer understanding of the dietary grounds of
their unchanging obesity and disease levels.
165. See supra note 164. The Restaurant Association doubted that the regulations at
issue would achieve this goal. See N. Y State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d at 133.
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Interestingly, the Restaurant Association challenging this compelled
commercial speech regulation did not merely propose to be relieved of
all burdening of their commercial speech. Instead, the Restaurant
Association expressed a preference for a more detailed requirement as
to the variety of nutritional data points to be disclosed. 166 Thus, the
Restaurant Association preferred a substantially broader and more
nutritional information disclosure requirement. 167
Logically, there are several possible grounds on which to prefer a
more exhaustive nutritional labeling requirement. Nutrition, after all,
is not reducible to calories alone; sugars1 68 and sodium, for many
consumers, may be equally significant. 169 As well, restaurant chains
spanning more than one jurisdiction have an at least minimal interest
in the uniformity of the nutrition information disclosure requirements
they must meet. 170 And doubtless quite unlike the Restaurant
Association, a far less responsible regulated party could conceivably
prefer greater disclosure requirements for the sake of cognitively
overloading some customers who might otherwise choose to dine
elsewhere. 171
A crucial problem thus lies in the fact that the substantial
government interest in nutrition labeling, in tobacco, and in most other
commercial contexts, cannot possibly be the mere publication, public
display, or mere disclosure of the information in question. A genuinely
substantial government interest, in the compelled commercial speech
cases, must more typically involve some substantial consumer behavior
change as a result of the mandated disclosure. 172 A more nutritionally
166. See N.Y State Rest. Assn, 556 F.3d at 133.
167. Id.
168. Note, e.g., the emphasis on added sugars, as distinct from calories, at issue in Am.
Beverage Assn, 916 F.3d at 753.
169. And perhaps less well estimated without the labels. See the discussions
associated with the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535,
104 Stat. 2353, codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 321, 337, 343, 345, 371 (2000). Whether, after
almost thirty years, the Act has led to significant reductions in nutrition-based major
diseases is plainly open to debate. For background, see, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY
GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISES OF TRANSPARENCY
189 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2007).
170. See FUNG, supra note 169, at 190.
171. See generally the sophisticated analysis in OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E.
SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE
(Princeton Univ. Press ed., 2014).
172. A government might conceivably claim that the interest at stake is merely in a
better-informed consumer public, even if the public's behavior then remains unchanged.
But it is implausible to say that the government's interest in better informed, but
unchanged levels of, say, dangerous obesity is itself substantial.
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informed, but no less self-destructive, public can hardly constitute a
substantial government interest.
Some courts have begun to recognize the possibility of a failure of the
enhanced availability of information to then be translated into an
increase in legislatively preferred consumer behaviors. Disclosure may
not enhance and may even undermine consumer compliance, especially
as the overall number of required consumer disclosures proliferates.17 3
Time and attention devoted to one mandated commercial disclosure by
a typical consumer may mean less time and attention for another,
perhaps more significant, disclosure. 174
These and related problems and paradoxes have been usefully
explored by Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider. They argue that in
the commercial context, "'[m]andated disclosure" may be the most
common and least successful regulatory technique in American law." 175
The available empirical evidence indicates that, in general, "people
don't notice disclosures, don't read them if they see them, can't
understand them if they try to read them, and can't use them if they
read them." 176
Inescapably, there are problems of the "various forms and degrees of
illiteracy and innumeracy."177 In general, mandated disclosures, where
they do work, tend to disproportionately help these who are already
well off and may need help the least.178 More broadly, any given
compelled disclosure may, for the consumer, impose a cognitive
"overload."179 And then there is a different sort of "overload" problem, in
which mandated commercial disclosures accumulate and "become so
numerous that none of us can begin to read and assimilate all of the
173. See CTIA-The Wireless Assn, 873 F.3d at 777 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting in the
denial of the petition for rehearing en bane) (citing CTIA-Wireless Ass'n v. City of
Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1126 (Friedland, J., dissenting in part)). It has been argued that
warning-proliferation may actually "backfire" due to warning-fatigue, anxious
overreaction resulting in adverse health outcomes, and a rebellious "forbidden-fruit"
effect. See The Side Effects of Health Warnings, SOCIAL ISSUES RESEARCH CENTRE
BULLETIN (May 12, 1999), www.sirc.org/news/sideeffects.html. Not all such warnings, of
course, are legally mandated.
174. See id.
175. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 171, at 3.
176. Id. at 55. But consider, paradoxically, the problem of the arguably overwhelming
proliferation of such required disclosures. See id. at 56. This suggests the further problem
that genuinely helpful mandated commercial speech may tend disproportionately to help
those who are already privileged in economic class or educational status. See id.
177. Id. at 56.
178. See id. at 56, 136.
179. See id. at 56.
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disclosures thrust upon us." 180 The food and nutrition labels we have
referred to throughout have been particularly judged to be commonly
ineffective. 181
When compelled disclosures are suspected of largely failing of their
purpose, there is often still a feeling that better results would follow if
the disclosures in question could be re-written in "simpler" terms. 182
Attempts to "simplify" required commercial disclosures, however, create
their own problems. 183 Such attempts generate not only distortions, but
their own further complexities. 184 The problem of excessive mandated
speech185 reflects the fact that legislatures may tend to focus on the
given problem at hand, rather than on noticing as well that their
proliferating mandates unfortunately tend, cumulatively, to "overgraze
the disclosure commons." 186
Part of the cause of chronically excessive, if often ineffective,
commercial mandates may be that such mandates do not typically
impose substantial direct financial costs on the government itself. 187
Once the regulation is imposed on private actors, any monitoring costs
are largely at the discretion of the government, as are any costs of later
amending the rule. 188 For regulated parties, the costs of compliance may
be far lower than discontinuing sales of the product or service in
question-assuming the regulation was not actually sought by one or
more of the regulated commercial speakers. 189 And more generally, such
regulations may be thought of as a less controversial alternative to
180. Id. Think of the remarkably detailed literature insert accompanying many over-
the-counter medicines generally thought of, by consumers and others, as typically safe. In
fact, to some consumers, a leaflet, rather than a prohibition of the product, may suggest
the product's safety, based on government investigation.
181. See id. at 43, 136-37.
182. See id. at 119, 140.
183. See id. at 119 & ch. 8.
184. See id. at 119; R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of
Why the Law Can't Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 715 (2000).
185. Cf more broadly R. George Wright, Public Fora and the Problem of Too Much
Speech, 106 KY. L.J. 409 (2018).
186. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 171, at 139. The underlying reference is
presumably to Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(suggesting, by broad implication, that the adopters of each separate new commercial
speech requirement would not fully account for the cumulatively suboptimal consequences
of other legislation doing likewise).
187. See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 171, at 145.
188. See id.
189. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
610 [Vol. 71
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
prohibiting sales of the product, or to paternalistic policies involving a
hard shove rather than a mere nudge. 190
The costs of ineffective compelled commercial speech rules may not,
however, be confined to the speaker, or to the considerations noted
above. In some cases, compelled speech mandates can do other sorts of
harm as well. In particular, compelled commercial speech rules may in
effect politically "block" the adoption of any other alternative kind of
regulation, even if the alternative might be somewhat more effective.
This concern applies especially with respect to less well-off groups who
would benefit disproportionately from more effective forms of
regulation. 19 1 More generally, compelled speech requirements "can
undercut other regulation, . . . impair decisions, injure markets,
exacerbate inequality, and in some important cases, cripple valuable
enterprises." 192
The background in which the mandated disclosure takes place may
also dilute or, in an extreme case, negate any consumer guidance value.
Consider again the important field of information and advice regarding
nutrition, diet, and health risks. This field is not yet, to say the least, an
190. For background, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Penguin Books ed.,
2009); Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). For recent arguments for the policy merits of stronger forms
of paternalism, see SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE
PATERNALISM (Cambridge University Press ed., 2013); JASON HANNA, IN OUR BEST
INTEREST: A DEFENSE OF PATERNALISM (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2018).
191. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 171, at 169; See also supra notes 176 and
accompanying text.
192. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 171, at 169. Professor Sunstein takes up
some of these concerns in Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges That Fail, 20 BEHAVIOURAL PUB.
POL'Y 4 (2017). For criticism of BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 171, see, e.g.,
Margaret Jane Radin, Less Than I Wanted to Know: Why Do Ben-Shahar & Schneider
Attack Only Mandated' Disclosure? (2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2462818, as well as the virtual book
symposium available at
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprof blog/20 14/09/introducing-the-authors
(Sept. 11, 2014). For elaboration of some of the problems noted by Ben-Shahar &
Schneider, see, e.g., Uri Benoliel, Jenny Buchan & Tony Gutentag, Revisiting the
Rationality of Disclosure Laws: An Empirical Analysis, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (2017)
(noting beyond the problem of consumers' bounded rationality, there is also a common
consumer bias toward undue personal optimism concerning the disclosed risks); Oren
Bar-Gill, David Schkade & Cass R. Sunstein, Drawing False Inferences From Mandated
Disclosures, https://doi.org/10.1017/bpp.2017.12 (Nov. 14, 2017) (raising the possibility
that consumers might be over-deterred in interpreting as a warning a particular
disclosure that is motivated instead merely by right-to-know or anti-competitive
considerations).
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exact science. 193 Consumer confusion as to food, health, and nutrition
risks in some areas has been, and remains, pervasive. 194 In this area, at
least, the overall available consumer information, including
recommendations and warnings, has been "[i]nconsistent, incomplete,
and contradictory."1 9 5
Consumer confusion over inconsistent unofficial and official advice
leads to skepticism, and perhaps even to policy "backfiring," including
with respect to even the best-supported nutrition advice. 196 Nor is
consumer confusion as to health warnings limited by educational level
or by age. 197 And to these factors, we must add in important
uncertainties as to how much attention is actually paid by consumers to
consumer nutrition labels, as well as to the extent of any linkage
between reading such labels and improved health. 198 As for the likely
193. See, e.g., the observation of the renowned social science methodologist John
loannidis, Editorial: Implausible Results in Human Nutrition Research (Nov. 14, 2013),
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.f668 ("[a]lmost every single nutrient imaginable has peer
reviewed publications associating it with almost any outcome").
194. See, e.g., Foodinsight.org, 2018 Food and Health Survey (May 13, 2018),
https://foodinsight.org/2018-food-and-health-survey.
195. Lara Spiteri Cornish & Caroline Moraes, The Impact of Consumer Confusion on
Nutrition Literacy and Subsequent Dietary Behavior (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://doi.org/10. 1002/mar.20800.
196. See Rebekah H. Nagler, Adverse Outcomes Associated with Media Exposure to
Contradictory Nutrition Messages, 19 J. HEALTH COMMUNICATIONS 24 (2014) (noting,
however, the possibility that some persons with a disease now claim greater prior
confusion than actually existed). See also the "backfiring" responses noted supra note 173.
197. See Rebekah H. Nagler, supra note 196; Contradictory Nutrition News Creates
Consumer Confusion, (Jan. 28, 2014),
www. sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140128153814.htm. A conscientious consumer
might notice contradictory claims regarding, say risky levels of dietary sodium intake.
See, e.g., Michael H. Alderman & David A. McCarron, Are You Getting Too Much Salt in
Your Diet? Probably Not, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (June 2, 2019),
www.wsj.com/articles/are-you-getting-too-much-salt (noting the range of conflicting
recommendations); Larry Husten, Lancet Paper Adds to Evidence That Reducing Salt to
Very Low Levels May Be Dangerous, (Apr. 9,2018), www.cardiobrief.org/2018/08/09/lancet-
paper-adds-to-evidence; Jane E. Henney, et al., Sodium-Intake Reduction and the Food
Industry, N ENGL J MED (May 29, 2019), www.nejm.org/full/10.1056/NEJMpl905244
(citing Dietary Reference Intakes for Sodium and Potassium, FOOD POL'Y, (March 5, 2019),
www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/Reports/2019/dietary-reference-intakes-sodium-
potassium.aspx) (noting some remaining uncertainties).
198. There may certainly be a positive relationship between nutrition label use and
the directly related choice of healthier products. See Jesus Barreiro-Hurle, Azucena
Gracia & Tiziana de Magistris, Does Nutrition Information on Food Products Lead to
Healthier Food Choices?, 35 FOOD POL'Y 221, 228 (2010). The actual degree to which
nutritional labels are consulted is uncertain. See Gill Cowburn & Lynn Stockley,
Consumer Understanding and Use of Nutrition Labeling: A Systematic Review, 8 PUB.
HEALTH NUTRITION 21, 24 (2005); Cliona Ni Mhurchu et al., Do Nutrition Labels Influence
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overall health impact of reading nutrition and health labels, one study
concluded that "[d]espite food label use being associated with improved
dietary factors, label use alone is not expected to be sufficient in
modifying behavior ultimately leading to improved health outcomes." 199
The important subject matter of nutrition labeling-whether the
labeling is legally mandated or not-thus illustrates the broader overall
sense that the value of compelled commercial speech is typically
uncertain, dubious, limited, clearly mixed and offsetting, speculative
and conjectural, or simply not susceptible of persuasive assessment.
V. CONCLUSION
Legally compelled commercial speech is a commonplace phenomenon,
and in that sense, important. As one court has noted, "[i]nnumerable
federal and state regulatory programs require the disclosure of product
and other commercial information." 200 The evidentiary basis for such
regulations at the time of enactment 20 1 is, however, typically weak.202
Overall, the evidence seems to suggest that the effects of compelled
commercial speech tend to be modest to minimal, unfortunately skewed,
Healthier Food Choices?, 121 APPETITE 360, 360 (2018) (in one study involving barcoded
products, "[l]abels were viewed for 23% of all purchased products, with decreasing
frequency over time"). We may, however, tend not to read labels on purchased items if we
have purchased the item in the past, and have read the label on some prior occasion.
It is also possible that any positive relationship between reading nutrition labels and
healthier produce choices may reflect factors such as educational level or income. See
Robert E. Post, et al., Use of the Nutrition Facts Label in Chronic Disease Management:
Results from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, 110 J. Am. DIETETIC
AsS'N 628, 630 (2010).
199. Nicholas J. Ollberding, Randi L. Wolf & Isobel Contento, Food Label Use and Its
Relation to Dietary Intake Among US Adults, 110 J. Am. DIETETIC AsS'N 1233, 1233
(2010).
200. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs Ass'n, 272 F.3d at 116. Among other conspicuous examples, the
court lists securities disclosures, tobacco labeling, nutritional labeling, pollutant
concentrations in water discharges, toxic substance releases, prescription drug
advertisements, workplace hazards, and warnings of exposures to hazardous substances.
See id. Again, though, as the need for such warnings increase so, typically, should the
value of actually reducing, in some sensible way, the risks involved and numbers of
persons affected, as distinct from merely putting potentially adversely affected parties on
some sort of notice of the risks in question.
201. For background and broader discussion, see R. George Wright, supra note 119.
202. See, merely for example, Arthur G. Fraas & Randall Lutter, How Effective Are
Federal Mandated Information Disclosures?, 7 J. BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 326 (2016).
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murky and indeterminate, mixed and offsetting, if not occasionally
backfiring perversely for unanticipated reasons. 203
We may, on this basis, conclude that the likely net effects of any
given compelled commercial speech rule will be, unpredictably, either
modestly positive, neutral, or modestly negative. But perhaps instead of
deciding these cases on the basis of our recommended inexpensive
random coin flip, the courts should presume against the
constitutionality of such regulations, and then factor in the weight of
free speech considerations.
The logic of current free speech case law, however, paradoxically
strengthens the argument for random coin flipping to decide compelled
commercial speech cases. The cases, again, assume that the free speech
interests of the compelled commercial speakers, unlike in political
speech cases and in other sorts of commercial speech regulation cases,
are modest.204 The primary speech interests in the compelled
commercial speech cases are instead assumed to be those of actual or
potential consumers of the product or service in question. 205 The
interests of consumers, though, is again precisely what are only
dubiously, minimally, or even adversely served in practice by the
compelled commercial speech in the typical case. 206 A consumer's free
speech interest in receiving compelled commercial speech messages that
are typically confusing, ineffective, modestly effective, variously
overwhelming, or even perverse in their overall effect is, inescapably,
limited at best.
We are left, then, in typical compelled commercial speech cases, with
distinctly modest actual promotion of any relevant government interest,
and with similarly modest overall advancement of the relevant free
speech interests. Despite the perceptions of the parties, little is typically
at stake on either side of the case. Rather than expensively and, in the
aggregate, arbitrarily adjudicate, such cases, we would be better off
resolving this class of cases through the inexpensive toss of a coin. 207
203. See supra Section IV. For a survey of perverse, largely ineffective, or harmful
results, see Kesten C. Green & J. Scott Armstrong, Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory
Disclaimers in Advertising, 31 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 293, 293 (2016).
204. See supra note 92 and accompanying text; Wu, supra note 59, at 2009.
205. See id.
206. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
207. The parties' knowledge that any otherwise appropriate such case will at some
point be decided randomly, through a coin toss, should discourage often futile discovery
expenses. To the extent that either governments or commercial parties do not find the
prospect of a coin-flip to be especially dignified or otherwise attractive, the coin-flip rule
should then incentivize significantly better empirical research into this area of the law,
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and significantly better justified governmental regulations, so that the logic of coin-flip
adjudication would then become obsolete. See supra note 201.
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